Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 Fall

Article 12

A New Solution for Salary Disputes: Implementing
Salary Arbitration in the National Basketball
Association
Scott Bukstein

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes: Implementing Salary Arbitration in the National Basketball Association, 22 Marq.
Sports L. Rev. 25 (2011)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol22/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

BUKSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2012 2:42 PM

A NEW SOLUTION FOR SALARY DISPUTES:
IMPLEMENTING SALARY ARBITRATION IN
THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION
SCOTT BUKSTEIN∗
This paper proposes that the National Basketball Association (NBA) adopt
a salary arbitration system in specifically defined circumstances—for
restricted free agents who either last played under a four-year rookie salary
scale contract, or last played under a two-year or three-year contract as a
second-round draft pick or undrafted free agent. Part I of this paper
summarizes the use of salary arbitration in professional sport leagues. Part II
of this paper provides an overview of the current arbitration procedures in the
NBA. Part III of the paper outlines a proposed new NBA salary arbitration
model. Part IV discusses some of the problems associated with the NBA’s
current restricted free agency and qualifying offer rules and explains how the
proposed salary arbitration system would alleviate these problems. Part V
provides a case study illustrating a potential trend in the NBA that supports the
overall goals of the salary arbitration framework proposed in this paper. Part
VI analyzes Major League Baseball’s (MLB) salary arbitration process and
how the proposed salary arbitration model for the NBA incorporates best
practices from MLB. Part VII analyzes the National Hockey League’s (NHL)
salary arbitration process and how the proposed salary arbitration model for
the NBA incorporates best practices from the National Hockey League. Part
VIII details some of the potential practical drawbacks and limitations
associated with the proposed NBA salary arbitration model. The paper
concludes with a recap of the potential positive impact of implementing the
proposed NBA salary arbitration framework.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE USE OF SALARY ARBITRATION IN PROFESSIONAL
SPORT LEAGUES
The NHL and MLB have utilized salary arbitration procedures to facilitate
interest-based contract negotiations and a fair resolution to salary disputes.
∗
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The NHL and MLB have implemented salary arbitration processes as a
compromise between giving all players the right to free agency and keeping
the option clause and reserve systems in place, which had allowed teams to
unilaterally and perpetually renew a player’s contract.1 The MLB salary
arbitration system has become a significant factor in driving player salaries
upward, thus generating negative reaction amongst team owners because the
system provides players with additional leverage in settling contract disputes.
The MLB system has been in place since 1973, with very few changes to the
basic structure and application of its final offer arbitration format, which is
designed to facilitate solution-oriented negotiations and actually discourage an
arbitration hearing. 2 The NHL salary arbitration system has been used since
the 1970 season for players who meet certain criteria in order to provide
players with an opportunity to settle salary disagreements with their teams by
submitting cases to a third-party arbitrator. 3 The NBA has never used any
type of salary arbitration.
All three leagues (MLB, NHL, and NBA) operate under a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). All three leagues require that a player
accumulate a certain amount of service before the player can become a free
agent. Similar to the NHL, the NBA operates under a salary cap. 4 The
National Football League (NFL) is the other main professional sports league
that has a salary cap, and the NFL has never used salary arbitration. One line
of reasoning is that there is a direct correlation between a league having a

1. See Melanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary
Cap Systems, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 189, 193 (2003).
2. See Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball’s Monetary Structure–Salary
Arbitration in Its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3 (2009); see also Aubut, supra
note 1, at 193.
3. During the most recent collective bargaining negotiations, NHL owners unsuccessfully pushed
for a final offer format to replace the current arbitration procedures because the owners felt that
players and agents held too much control over the arbitration process and salaries were skyrocketing.
See Stephen M. Yoost, Note, The National Hockey League and Salary Arbitration: Time for a Line
Change, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 485, 492 (2006).
4. NBA teams are allowed to exceed the salary cap, which was $57,700,000 for the 2009–2010
season, and sign players with “exceptions to the salary cap,” outlined in Article VII, Section 6 of the
league’s CBA. The luxury tax threshold, which was $69,920,000 for the 2009–2010 season, operates
as the main mechanism that helps put a cap on team spending. However, teams are allowed to sign or
trade for players whose salaries take the team over the luxury tax level. Teams with a payroll that
exceeds the tax level must pay a one-dollar tax for each dollar that their team salary is over the luxury
tax level, pursuant to the escrow and tax arrangement in Article VII, Section 12(f)(1) of the CBA, but
this penalty has not deterred about twenty to thirty percent of the teams each season from having team
payrolls that exceed the tax level. See Helmut Dietl, et al., The Effect of Luxury Taxes on Competitive
Balance, Club Profits, and Social Welfare in Sports Leagues, 5 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 41 (Aug. 2008);
see also Super Luxury Tax Breakdown, ESPN (Oct. 21, 2008), http://espn.go.com/blog/
truehoop/post/_/id/5498/super-luxury-tax-breakdown.
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salary cap and not allowing salary arbitration. Hence, if a league with a salary
cap had an arbitration system, this would result in escalating salaries that
greatly exceed the salary cap and substantially limit a team’s ability to sign
players. 5 While an argument can be made that the fact that both the NBA and
NFL employ a salary cap and not a salary arbitration system implies that
salary arbitration and the salary cap are mutually exclusive, if properly
designed, both systems together can foster competitive balance and maintain
economic stability for all teams. 6 This is particularly true given that the NHL
recently implemented an “Upper Limit of the Payroll Range” provision in the
league’s new CBA that functions as a hard salary cap.7
The NBA is ideally suited to employ a salary arbitration mechanism in
specifically defined circumstances—for restricted free agents who either last
played under a four-year rookie salary scale contract, or last played under a
two-year or three-year contract as a second-round pick or undrafted free
agent. 8 Thus, players who are eligible for arbitration under the proposed NBA
salary arbitration system discussed in this paper, which will be referred to as
“NBA-ARB,” will have played between two and four full seasons in the
NBA. 9 The NBA would have a more limited classification of players who

5. MLB, the professional sports league with the highest team payrolls and players’ salaries, does
not operate under a salary cap. However, MLB has a similar luxury tax arrangement where teams
whose aggregate payroll exceeds a certain annually determined figure are taxed on the excess amount.
Other arguments for why a league with a salary cap should not also have salary arbitration include the
concern that teams that drafted multiple first-round picks in a season would not agree to arbitration
with more than one of these marquee players because their salaries in arbitration would be too high
and allowing arbitration would almost render the concept of restricted free agency meaningless.
6. See Aubut, supra note 1, at 193.
7. NHL teams cannot sign players above the upper limit salary cap, which was $56,800,000 for
the 2009–2010 season. See NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION,
art. 50, § 50.5 (2005) [hereinafter NHL CBA] for salary cap provisions. Prior to the resolution of the
2004–2005 lockout the NHL was the only major professional sports league that had no luxury tax,
revenue sharing, salary cap, or salary floor.
8. Under Article I, Section 1(yy) of the NBA’s CBA, a “‘[r]estricted [f]ree [a]gent’ means a
[v]eteran [f]ree [a]gent who is subject to a [t]eam’s right of first refusal.” NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE JULY 2005, art.
I, § 1(yy) (2005) [hereinafter NBA CBA]. Under Article XI, Section 4(a)(i) and 4(b), any first-round
pick who finished the fourth season of his rookie scale contract (which is for two guaranteed years
and two team option years) and any veteran free agent who will have three or fewer years of service
entering the off-season will be a restricted free agent if his prior team makes a qualifying offer to the
player at any time from the day following the season (e.g., in mid-June after the NBA Finals) through
June 30. If such a qualifying offer is made, then, on July 1, the player shall become a restricted free
agent, subject to a right of first refusal in favor of the prior team. Id. art. XI, § 4(a)(i), (b).
9. An NBA rookie who signs two successive one-year contracts, or a one-year contract followed
by a two-year contract, to start his career would also be eligible for arbitration under NBA-ARB after
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could become arbitration-eligible than in MLB; a particular player could only
be eligible for NBA-ARB twice compared to up to four times in baseball. 10
Although the NFL does not have a salary arbitration system, the league’s
“Franchise Player” designations and “Transition Player” designations provide
a CBA-formulated instrument that attempts to calculate a player’s fair value
for one season without having to appeal to a third-party neutral to determine
what a player should be paid for that season. The designations mandate that
teams must make a particular one-year required tender offer that is calculated
based on the average of the top-five or top-ten player salaries at the designated
player’s relevant position.11 If a player is designated a Franchise Player, he
can only negotiate or sign a contract with his prior team. If a player is
designated a Transition Player, he can sign a contract with a new team, but his
prior team has the right of first refusal and would receive draft pick
compensation in return for not matching the new team’s offer.12 The
Franchise Player designations and Transition Player designations are the same
value for every player at the relevant position. Thus, there is not an
independent calculation of the fair-market value for a particular player—it is
assumed to be the average of the annual salaries of the top five or ten highest
paid players at the position.
The NBA does not currently have any similar procedure to calculate a
player’s fair-market value via a Franchise Player designation or Transition
Player designation. An identical designation system to the one used in the
NFL would likely not be effective in the NBA. This is because the average
salary of the top-ten players at each position is extremely high, and the market
value for the majority of restricted free agents would not reach this level.13
the second or third season.
10. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
AND THE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 20, 2006, art.
VI, § F(1), art. XX, § B(3) (2006) [hereinafter MLB CBA]. MLB arbitration applies to players with
between three and six years of Major League service, “super twos” who rank in the top seventeen
percent of the class of players with between two and three years of service and have accumulated
eighty-six days of service in the immediately preceding season, and to free agents offered arbitration
by the team that they played for in the prior year. MLB’s arbitration system allows players who are
eligible for arbitration under the above criteria to submit the issue of his salary to final and binding
arbitration without the consent of the team.
11. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE MARCH 8, 2006, art. XX,
§§ 1–5 (2006) [hereinafter NFL CBA]. Franchise Player and Transition Player Designations allow a
current team to designate a player who would otherwise be a free agent, which gives that team either
sole negotiation rights or the right of first refusal on a contract that the player signs with another team.
12. Id.
13. By way of example, for the ten highest paid power forwards, the position in the NBA with
the most money allocated to the top-ten players at a position, the average salary during the 2009–2010
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Teams in the NBA do not have the option of offering any type of market value
designation to keep a player’s rights while locking the player into a set process
for determining that one-year salary. Restricted free agents in the NBA find
themselves in situations where their prior team will frequently make a low-ball
offer and tell them to sign an offer sheet with a new team that the prior team
will match. 14 Creating a formula to calculate Franchise Player or Transition
Player designations for NBA players would not be as useful in encouraging
negotiated settlements, which are reasonable to both the player and the team,
as a comprehensive salary arbitration system. The proposed NBA-ARB
system would have mechanisms to control arbitration awards so that salaries
do not escalate out of control. Calculating a player’s salary under NBA-ARB
would be on an individualized case-by-case basis because creating a formula
derived from the average or median salaries of the top-paid players at a
particular position would not typically result in an NBA player being paid a
fair-market value salary. 15
II. CURRENT USE OF GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION AND SYSTEM ARBITRATION
IN THE NBA
The NBA has recognized the effectiveness of an arbitration process, as
players in the NBA are subject to CBA rules providing for grievance
arbitration. Arbitration in the NBA is not used during the actual salary
negotiation process; rather, it is used after a player contract is agreed upon for
disputes concerning the validity of a contract, involving the interpretation of or

season was $14,696,993, which would constitute 25.5% of the league’s salary cap for each team (with
a mandatory thirteen-man roster) and 21.0% of the league’s luxury tax level for the 2009–2010
season. Additionally, the average salary for the top ten point guards was $13,651,008, which
constitutes 23.6% of the league’s salary cap and 19.5% of the luxury tax. This is compared to NFL
transition designations with a $12,444,000 average salary for the top ten highest paid quarterbacks
and a $8,370,000 average salary for the top ten highest paid cornerbacks, which equates to 9.7% and
6.5%, respectively, of the league’s $128,000,000 salary cap in 2009 for each team (with twenty-two
starters and a fifty-five person roster). Over the past five off-seasons, only one NBA restricted free
agent, Andre Iguodala, has signed a contract with an annual average of at least $12,000,000. See
generally Salaries, HOOPDATA.COM, http://hoopdata.com/salaries/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 3,
2011); see also Franchise and Transition Tender Amounts, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/news/
story?id=09000d5d806a24a3&template=without-video&confirm=true (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
14. An “offer sheet” is a contract offer signed with a new team; it must be for at least two seasons
not including an option year but does not have to contain 100% salary compensation protection. See
NBA CBA, supra note 8, art. XI, § 5(b).
15. For reference, the average and median annual salaries for the seventeen NBA starting
shooting guards who are not under a rookie salary scale contract or a maximum salary contract are
$9,708,950 and $9,500,000, respectively.
See NBA Player Salaries, DRAFTEXPRESS.COM,
http://www.draftexpress.com/nba-player-salaries (last visited Oct. 3, 2011); see also Salaries, supra
note 13.
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compliance with certain provisions of the CBA, and for player disciplinary
actions where the issue to be resolved relates to whether there has been just
cause for the penalty imposed. 16
There is also system arbitration that is used primarily for league-teamunion disputes, but also for disagreements about certain player-contract
terms. 17 Player-agent arbitration cases are handled under the National
Basketball Players Association’s (NBPA) Regulations Governing Player
Agents, which has its own grievance arbitration procedure. Based on the
detailed, coordinated structure, accessibility, and overall success of the NBA’s
grievance arbitration procedures, the NBA would benefit from implementing a
similar arbitration system for salary disputes—one that furthers the league’s
financial and parity goals, maintains competitive balance between teams,
decreases negative publicity and media scrutiny about unconstructive
negotiations, and provides players and team management with the tools and
processes necessary to operate a winning organization.
III. A NEW PROCESS: A KEY OPPORTUNITY TO IMPLEMENT SALARY
ARBITRATION IN THE NBA
Many NBA players are significantly underpaid because of the current
CBA rules for restricted free agents, and other players are overpaid because of
these same inapt rules. The proposed NBA salary arbitration model, NBAARB, would combine elements of MLB and NHL salary arbitration (see Table
1 for the specific process and criteria for the proposed new Article XI, Section
5 of the NBA CBA). NBA-ARB would be an issue-by-issue variation of
“night baseball arbitration.” The team and player would both file salary
numbers and complete a one-page “one-year salary request” form to be
delivered in a sealed envelope to the panel of arbitrators. The parties would
not exchange these figures. The arbitrator would determine the arbitration
award without the benefit or guidance of seeing the parties’ proposals. By not
allowing the arbitrator to see the parties’ filing figures, the arbitrator’s mindset

16. See NBA CBA, supra note 8, art. VI, XI, and XXXI. Common disputes involve whether
incentive compensation should be classified as likely to be earned for cap purposes, players under
contract withholding services, transactions with retired players, and salary guarantees. Common
disciplinary actions include player conduct, fines, suspensions, injuries, off the court activities, guns,
actions taken by Commissioner to preserve integrity of and maintain public confidence in the game,
and violations of player misconduct provisions in the League Constitution such as trade demands and
statements detrimental to the NBA.
17. See id. art. XIII, XIV, and XXXII. Common contractual term disputes include contents of an
offer sheet and which team has a binding agreement, league audit reports, collusion, expansion,
circumvention, basketball-related income (BRI) revenue, escrow amounts, group licensing, and NBA
memos unilaterally promulgated by the league.
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will not be anchored by an extremely high or low proposal. More importantly,
because the format is not final offer, high-low, the arbitrator would not have to
focus on the midpoint between the two proposals, which is the typical
benchmark for a salary arbitration panel in baseball.18 By having the team and
player conceal and not exchange figures, one party would not be able to
scramble to settle on the other party’s side of the midpoint before a hearing out
of fear of losing the case entirely after that party submitted an extreme initial
offer. 19
The issue-by-issue component, which is a broader concept than having an
arbitrator merely determine pure base salary compensation, allows arbitrators
to have flexibility to balance the award across different issues presented by the
parties and make a determination of each element independently or as a
package. 20 Unlike the MLB system, where the arbitrator’s award is limited to
a player’s base salary, NBA-ARB would allow the arbitrators to have
discretion to include incentive compensation or a trade bonus in the award.
Because the arbitrators will not have viewed the parties’ actual salary filing
figures, the parties at the hearing can point to comparable players who
received specific types of incentive compensation or trade bonuses. 21
The phases of NBA-ARB would mirror certain procedural elements of the
NBA’s grievance and system arbitration processes. It would also be modeled
after, and track some of the language contained in, the NHL and MLB
arbitration procedure provisions, including the following language: at any
meeting or hearing, a player may be accompanied by a representative of the
players association, and the NBA and any team involved may be accompanied
by a representative; all costs of arbitration, including the fees and expenses of
the arbitrator, shall be borne equally by the parties, but each party shall bear
18. Edmonds, supra note 2, at 35.
19. Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 231 (1998).
20. Spencer B. Gordon, Final Offer Arbitration in the New Era of Major League Baseball, 6 J.
AM. ARB. 153, 160 (2007).
21. One complication is that an arbitrator will be determining one prime issue (base salary) and
other ancillary issues (incentives, trade bonuses), which would not allow the parties to keep the
process as simple and streamlined as in the MLB arbitration context that allows arbitrators to award
only single-year contracts for specified salaries. Teams would most likely argue for a lower base
compensation and more incentives, discussing the player’s situation broadly in terms of what other
players make and what types of bonuses they are receiving (e.g., for games played, minutes played,
All-Star games, shooting percentages). Under NBA-ARB, if an arbitrator’s award of base salary plus
incentives totals more than the player’s filed request, the decision would not be adjusted downwards
so long as the base salary does not exceed such request. The arbitrator would not rule on the
percentage of compensation protection because, under Article II, Section 4(a), (e), and (g) of the
NBA’s CBA, all one-year salary awards will have 100% compensation protection for lack of skill,
and non-insured injury or mental disability.
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the cost of its own witnesses, counsel, and the like; and no party may initiate
the arbitration process by filing or appearing at an arbitration hearing until and
unless it has first discussed the matter with the other party in an attempt to
settle the dispute. 22
Unlike the NHL, where the league office and National Hockey League
Players Association (NHLPA) provide the arbitrators with a “comparable
player list exhibit” that catalogs the only players that the arbitrators can rely on
for comparison purposes to the case at hand, NBA-ARB would allow each
party to craft creative arguments about which particular players to compare.23
Justifications for not having the NBA parties’ proposed lists of comparable
players restrained via a “comparable player list exhibit” include the fact that
there is already a limited sample group of players for parties to highlight.24
Due to the increasing use of analytics and sabermetrics for player and team
performance in basketball, there is an availability of statistics that gives teams,
agents, and arbitrators the ability to pinpoint a player’s value using
quantitative metrics. The NBA league office and the NBPA could develop a
universal database containing all possible statistics that could be offered in
arbitration.25
NBA-ARB would allow parties to present witnesses, affidavits,
documents, or other evidence so long as they met the state admissibility of
evidence provisions spelled out in the CBA. The arbitrators would not be
bound by any evidentiary rule and would therefore have the discretion to
determine the weight given to each piece of evidence. In the NHL, admissible
evidence includes the player’s overall performance, number of games played,
22. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12; MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § F; NBA CBA,
supra note 8, art. XXXI, §§ 14(b)–(f) and art. XXXI, § 2(b).
23. NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12.9(d), art. 12.9(g)(v).
24. For reference, there are only 220 players that are currently under non-rookie salary scale
contracts in the NBA who are making more than the minimum player salary for the 2009–2010
season; thus the sample group is limited to approximately 50% of all of the NBA players under
contract during a given season, because parties cannot use players currently under a rookie salary
scale contract as comparables. Furthermore, if the player was only worth a minimum player salary,
which tops out at $1,306,455, the team would almost certainly not waste the time and resources to
engage in the arbitration process. A player’s age and experience should not outweigh other factors
such as performance or role on the team. Differing from the NHL, in NBA-ARB, the parties would
be allowed to make an argument that any particular player is relevant, and not just those on a list
generated by the league and players association, that their client resembles for comparison purposes.
Players with similar career and season games and/or minutes played in the NBA (but not necessarily
years of service because players who play just one game in a season are credited with a full year of
service) and similar statistical production and roles on the team would provide the best comparisons.
See Salaries, supra note 13.
25. For example, the database could be similar to the statistics found at
http://www.nba.com/statistics, with advanced metrics employed by the NBA StatsCube and Synergy
Sports Technology data currently available to all NBA teams.
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injuries or illnesses, length of service in the league and with the particular
team, overall contribution to the team’s success or failure, special leadership
qualities or public appeal, and the performance and compensation of
comparable players in similar situations to the player who elected
arbitration. 26 Arbitrators in the proposed NBA-ARB system would be
instructed to allocate weight based on comparable players’ salaries and the
particular player’s years of service, position, statistical production, trends in
career, platform year performance, team success, restricted free agency status,
injury history, overall contribution, and role on the team. 27
In NBA-ARB, once the arbitrators looked at the evidence, they would
make a determination about what a fair one-year salary would be. The team
and player would establish their demands, including salary and other
contractual elements, but would not reveal them to the arbitrators. The parties
would be allowed to identify comparable players without explicitly stating a
particular salary that the player at the hearing deserves. The arbitrators would
determine the award based on issues regarding salary, incentives, structure,
and clauses, without the guidance of the parties’ proposals. Unlike in baseball,
whichever party’s filing figure is closest to the arbitrators’ determination will
not automatically be selected because the arbitrators would be permitted to
determine any compensation structure. Nonetheless, the arbitrators’ award
determination will likely fall somewhere within the spectrum between the
classified team and player proposals.
However, there would be an “arbitrator award adjustment” exception,
which would apply in two delineated circumstances: (1) if the arbitrators’
award determination is within 2% or $50,000 of the midpoint between the
figures filed by the team and the player, then the arbitrators’ award will
automatically be adjusted to be the exact midpoint between the two filing
figures; and (2) if the arbitrators’ award determination is within 2% or $50,000
of either party’s filing figure, then that party’s figure will be the actual award
and not the arbitrators’ decision.28 This exception encourages negotiated
settlement. If the dispute reaches a hearing, it nudges parties to have accurate

26. NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12, § 12.9(d), (g)(i–ii); MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, §
F(12)(a).
27. As mentioned previously, the universe of comparable players in NBA-ARB would not be
explicitly curtailed.
28. The midpoint is one way of making that determination in that it is a “bargained for” number,
but if a player settles below the midpoint (or in the case of NBA-ARB, an arbitrator reaches a result
below the midpoint), and is still compensated at a level that accurately reflects his value within the
system, he has not really lost in negotiations. Jay Reisinger, Debunking Salary Arbitration Myths –
Part 2, CONTEMP. SPORTS L. ISSUES (Feb. 9, 2010), http://jayreisinger.blogspot.com/2010/02/
debunking-salary-arbitration-myths-part_09.html.
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filing numbers that are not too high or too low to get close to the arbitrators’
potential decision. This would create a rational midpoint or increase the
likelihood that their filing number is close to what the arbitrators would pick,
so that the award would be adjusted upward or downward to the party’s actual
proposed figure.
For example, if a team files at $3,000,000, the player files at $4,000,000,
and the arbitrators’ monetary valuation of the player is between $3,430,000
and $3,570,000, the arbitrators’ valuation will be adjusted pursuant to the
“arbitrator award adjustment” exception and the midpoint of the filing figures
($3,500,000) will be the player’s salary because it will be less than 2% below
or above the $3,500,000 midpoint of the parties’ filing figures. If under the
same team and player filing figures above the arbitrators determine that the
player’s salary should be $3,060,000 or slightly less, the team’s $3,000,000
would be the final result. On the other hand, if the arbitrator decides that the
player’s salary should be $3,920,000 or slightly more, then the player’s
$4,000,000 would be the controlling outcome.
As with MLB’s salary arbitration system, one goal of NBA-ARB is to
ultimately have a fair salary being paid to players, determined by objective
criteria in an organized, expedited process with incentives to engage in
principled negotiations. This would create a different process than the current
environment, where teams give the player an ultimatum of either signing a
one-year deal at a preset amount or an offer sheet with a new team that the
current team could match with their right of first refusal. NBA-ARB would
encourage teams to negotiate in good faith with a certain category of current
players for one-year contracts, which would help avoid the possibility of
flooding in the free agent market, depleting player salaries, and damaging fan
identification as a result.29 NBA-ARB would also provide a mechanism that
would keep players in the NBA; over the past two off-seasons, three former
first-round draft picks grew frustrated with the current restricted free agency
and qualifying offer rules, and how their respective teams approached contract
negotiations based on the leverage created by these rules, and decided to sign
with teams in Europe. 30
NBA teams should have a superior right to keep their free agents, but they
should only be able to keep this right if they are willing to pay the player a
market-rate salary. The decision to tender a player for salary arbitration would
be in the teams’ hands—if a team is not willing to pay a player his fair-market

29. Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball
Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 59–60 (2003).
30. The three former first-round picks who signed contracts in Europe are Josh Childress, Linaz
Kleiza, and Nenad Krstic.
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value for a one-year contract, the player would be an unrestricted free agent
who can negotiate a long-term deal with another team. 31 In NBA-ARB, once
the player agrees to accept the “arbitration tender” offer, his current team will
gain certainty in that it will not lose the player’s services to another team; the
focus will be on negotiating the provisions of a fair one-year or multi-year
contract with the player.32 This is because once an NBA team offers salary
arbitration and the player accepts, the player would only be permitted to
negotiate exclusively with that team. Whereas in the NFL, a player who is
given a Transition Player designation can sign with another team, with the
prior team having the right of first refusal to match the contract offer or
receive draft pick compensation if the player signs with another team and the
current team decides not to match the offer.
Under NBA-ARB, once the team makes an arbitration tender, the player
can decide whether to accept the offer or to be bound to the arbitration
process. If he accepts the tender, he would be forfeiting the opportunity to
sign an offer sheet with a new team. Once the tender is accepted, the player
would then either accept or reject the “initial proposed salary” in the team’s
offer. The initial proposed salary would be a one-year contract with a salary
of at least the minimum salary and up to the maximum salary allowed under
CBA rules. 33 If the player agrees to accept the tender offer but rejects the
initial proposed salary, the parties would continue to engage in contract
discussions, for either a one-year or multi-year deal, prior to an arbitration
hearing, which would be scheduled within the following month. 34
31. Note that in NBA-ARB, the current team would have an advantage in that it can negotiate a
long-term contract during a one-week period prior to offering the arbitration tender and an additional
three weeks to continue negotiations before a hearing takes place, while also forcing the player to
decide whether or not he wants to be bound to the arbitration process.
32. Article IX, Section 1 of the NBA’s CBA allows a former first-round pick to re-sign with his
current team for a term of up to six years.
33. For the 2009–2010 season, the minimum initial proposed salary offer would have been
$736,420, and the maximum initial proposed salary offer would have been $13,520,500.
34. Currently, when a player signs a one-year qualifying offer, that player cannot be traded
without his consent. Under NBA-ARB, a player who signs a one-year contract pursuant to a salary
arbitration award could still not be traded (he would have a veto right, and could consent to a trade,
subject to the trade rules in Article VII, Section 8(d), which state that a player who signed a contract
as a free agent cannot be signed until the later of three months after the signing or the following
December 15). See NBA CBA, supra note 8, art. VII, § 8(b). However, there would be an added
clause: if the parties agree to a one-year contract prior to a hearing, the parties can agree to waive the
consent provision as a new allowable amendment under Article II, Section 3. Thus, teams who agree
to enter into the salary arbitration process and end up signing a player who accepts the arbitration
tender to a one-year contract pursuant to the arbitrators’ award would now be paying the player his
fair market value and could only trade the player to another team with that player’s consent. But,
parties who agree to a deal before the hearing can modify the consent provision. This rule would
encourage parties to negotiate a long-term deal and to only agree to a contract if both parties have
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If the player rejects the tender offer, he would become a restricted free
agent governed by the current CBA rules, free to sign a one-year or multi-year
deal with his prior team or another team. The caveat is that his prior team
would retain the right of first refusal to match any offer sheet, and the prior
team would only have to offer a “minimum salary tender offer” to maintain the
right of first refusal. 35 The player would lose his fallback option of returning
to the team under any type of rookie salary scale qualifying offer. 36 Thus, by
declining the arbitration tender offer, the player would be taking a risk of not
being offered a significant deal by another team and not having a contingency
alternative of what would have been a somewhat lucrative qualifying offer.
Once the request to have the player be bound by the arbitration process is
made, the player either accepts or declines the request. This changes the
dynamic of whether the player is going to stay with his current team. The
arbitration tender cannot be withdrawn by the team once offered. Once the
arbitration process begins, the player and team could agree to a multi-year
deal. Both parties would now have an objective starting point for contract
discussions—the player’s value for a one-year contract. The threat of going to
an arbitration hearing would hopefully result in a settlement as the parties can
create the contract elements without the costs, assistance, or uncertainty
provided by a third-party neutral’s determination at a hearing. If the team fails
to make the arbitration tender by the deadline of July 15, the player would
become an unrestricted free agent, where the prior team would not have the
right to match an offer sheet. The prior team would no longer have the benefit
of keeping a player restricted unless the team pays fair-market value via the
arbitration process.
NBA-ARB would utilize a two-member panel of arbitrators. While a twomember panel is a deviation from traditional odd-number panels, it is
intentions of playing out the entire season with the player on that team or if the player receives a
salary that justifies him giving up the right to consent to the trade. Players who consent to a trade
would be considered to have changed teams by means of signing a contract with the assignee team as
a free agent, and not by means of a trade, and thus would become non-qualifying veteran free agents
and the new team could only sign the player with available cap room, a salary cap exception, or for
120% of the player’s prior salary. See also id. One concern with this new proposed provision is that
changing the rules to allow parties to agree to waive the consent provision may conflict with the
purpose of the rule; a team could possibly agree to re-sign its own player with the intention of the
team or player to trade him later in the season to another team who would be unable to sign that
player as a free agent with available cap room or an exception.
35. See NBA CBA, supra note 8, art. VII, § 4(a)(2)(ii), (d)(1)(ii). The player’s “free agent
amount” (the hold that would count against the salary cap) would still be either 130%, 250%, or
300%, depending if the player is an early qualifying of qualifying veteran free agent and if his prior
salary was equal to or less than the average player salary.
36. Every restricted free agent who has signed a qualifying offer during the past six seasons has
waited until close to the October 1 deadline to do so.
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consistent with the system first employed by the NHL for salary disputes.37
The case would be submitted to two arbitrators, one nominated by the team
and the other by the player, and if these nominees could not agree, the dispute
would then be submitted to a third arbitrator. The third arbitrator, who would
have the tie-breaking vote, would be randomly selected from the pool of
available arbitrators for that off-season’s hearings. The arbitrator would have
access to a videotape of the hearing, and the parties’ pre-hearing briefs and
exhibits presented at the hearing, but would not communicate directly with the
two-member panel.
A two-member panel would help create improved dialogue and an
opportunity to study the market together and reach a joint consensus. The
two-member panel would also help avoid the phenomena of arbitrators
strategically not siding with one party too often and of “groupthink” that
seems to happen occasionally in a three-person panel in baseball.38 For
reference, of the eight MLB salary arbitration cases that went to a hearing in
2010, three arbitrators heard three different cases, and three other arbitrators
heard two different cases during this same three-week period of arbitration
hearings—only one of these arbitrators voted for the same party in every case
that they presided over. 39
The two-member panel in the NBA-ARB would be able to craft an
appropriate one-year contract, resolving any disagreements between each other
without forcing the other to side with the majority. This is contrasted to a
three-member panel that could allow the two-person majority to influence the
third arbitrator to consent to the viewpoint of the majority. Even if the third
arbitrator dissented from the majority viewpoint, her vote would be rendered
meaningless to the final outcome. While a two-member panel may have
reached the same conclusions, not having a third member might allow the
parties to more thoroughly consider each arbitrator’s viewpoint of the case
without the potential of forming a majority alliance with a second arbitrator in
a three-member structure. In NBA-ARB, an individual arbitrator would not be
allowed to hear more than two cases in the same season, and he or she could

37. See Aubut, supra note 1, at 204.
38. See Joseph M. Weiler, Legal Analysis of the NHL Player’s Contract, 3 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
59, 71 (1992).
39. Fredric Horowitz voted for the same party, the team, in both cases that he presided over this
past season. Historically, over the past ten seasons, there have been five instances where the same
arbitrator heard disputes involving the same team in a particular off-season, and only once did the
arbitrator decide with the same party, in this case Steven Goldberg ruling for the Astros in 2008
twice.
Maury Brown, Arbitration Scorecard, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM (Feb. 10, 2007),
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/ index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=719&Itemid=116;
see also http://sports-law.blogspot.com/ search?q=arbitration.
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not hear more than one case involving a particular team or player
representative in two successive seasons. 40
The process timeline, evidence criteria, adjustments, and exceptions of
NBA-ARB would encourage the parties to file a reasonable offer, seek
security in a negotiated pre-hearing settlement, and avoid taking exaggerated
positions at a hearing. 41 Once a team submits the matter to NBA-ARB, the
player or team could not withdraw from arbitration and the parties could not
terminate the arbitration for any reason. In MLB, the player may, within
seven days after receiving the team’s salary arbitration notification, notify the
team that he does not wish to arbitrate the matter.42 In MLB arbitration, a
player whose hearing is scheduled later in the process may benefit from
previous arbitration awards. 43 In NBA-ARB, to avoid any allegation of
favoritism, one arbitrator would be responsible for drawing names from a box
to figure out the order of hearings. In NBA-ARB, an arbitrator would not be
prevented from granting a player a salary that the arbitrator deems appropriate
because it would go over the team’s salary cap; a newly created “salary
arbitration alignment” exception would allow a team to sign up to two players
each season to one-year contracts under the newly created salary arbitration
alignment exception.44
IV. DRAWBACKS OF THE NBA’S CURRENT RESTRICTED FREE AGENCY AND
QUALIFYING OFFER RULES, AND THE EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OF SALARY
ARBITRATION
The NBA’s current qualifying offer system lacks efficiency, effectiveness,
and fairness for players and teams. Under the existing restricted free agency
rules, a player who receives a qualifying offer must be given until at least
October 1 to accept the offer. 45 The current qualifying offer rules lead to a
40. See LAURA COOPER, ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 690 (2d ed. 2004). Arbitrators can
sometimes favor teams or agents who are repeat players more familiar with the pool of potential
arbitrators, particularly where an arbitrator may be interested in generating future business and thus
predisposed to favor one party—this is a distinguishing feature in that most employees do not have a
representative who also represents other players who compete for different employers in the league.
41. Josh Chetwynd, Play Ball? An Analysis of Final offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League
Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes, 20
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 112 (2009).
42. MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § F(4).
43. Aubut, supra note 1, at 237.
44. This exception would be added to the list of current exceptions available in Article VII,
Section 6 of the NBA’s CBA.
45. The October 1 deadline is ninety days after the date by which the qualifying offer must be
made, and is just one day before the start of a team’s training camp for the upcoming season. Under
the existing rules, a qualifying offer may be unilaterally withdrawn by the team at any time through
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drawn out process that creates too much uncertainty for players and teams and
leads to unsatisfactory results. The free-agent market and player salaries in
general have outpaced the current qualifying offers tendered to players
because the qualifying offers are not tied in any way to market comparables.
The NBA’s current qualifying offer system is flawed mainly because the
number pick that a player is selected in the NBA Draft does not always
indicate his value four years later.46 Under NBA-ARB, there would be new
rules for first-round draft picks that would replace the current required
qualifying offer that has a predetermined salary increase over the player’s
fourth-year salary of their rookie scale contract based on where the player was
selected in the NBA Draft. For first-round picks, qualifying offers range from
a 30% increase from the fourth-year salary for the first overall pick to a 50%
increase for the thirtieth pick. 47 For reference, for 2010 NBA Draft picks, the
2013–2014 qualifying offer amounts range from $9,394,958 for the first pick
to $3,101,820 for the thirtieth pick. The NBA-ARB system would produce
one-year contracts for different players with salaries within this range, but
without the salaries being allocated to a player based on where he was selected
in the draft. In NBA-ARB, there would be a cap placed on the maximum
salary for an NBA arbitration-eligible player—no one-year salary could
exceed 12.5% of the salary cap for that season. Accordingly, for the 2009–
2010 season, no player would have received a salary greater than $7,212,500
in arbitration, which is slightly below the $8,182,598 qualifying offer that the
first pick in the 2005 NBA Draft would have received under the current
rules. 48
Over the past six seasons, only seven former first-round NBA Draft picks

July 23 following its issuance. If the qualifying offer is not withdrawn on or before July 23, it may be
withdrawn thereafter but only if the player agrees in writing to the withdrawal. If a qualifying offer is
withdrawn, the player shall immediately become an unrestricted free agent. See NBA CBA, supra
note 8, art. XI, § 4(c)(i).
46. For instance, there have been eight different players selected to the All-Star Game in the past
two years who were drafted outside of the top fifteen picks. See NBA & ABA All-Star Game History
and Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/allstar (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011).
47. The NBA rookie salary scale can be found in Exhibit B of the CBA. See also Exhibit BRookie Scale, NBAP.ORG, http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005/exhibit-b-rookie-scale (last visited Oct. 3,
2011).
48. The cap placed on an arbitration-eligible player’s salary is similar to the NHL’s rules, which
state that no one player can make more than 20% of the league’s salary cap (e.g., no one player could
receive a salary greater than $11.36 million for the 2009–2010 NHL season). Regulating the
maximum amount that any one player can receive will curtail any drastic inflation in player salaries
based on precedent set in an arbitration hearing. See Yoost, supra note 3, at 517–19; Collective
Bargaining Agreement FAQs, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=26366 (last visited
Oct. 3, 2011).
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who became restricted free agents following the fourth year of their rookiescale contract signed qualifying offers with their prior team (see Table 2 for a
list of restricted free agents signing qualifying offers during the past six
seasons). The amount of a qualifying offer is based on where a player was
drafted, predetermined by the rookie salary scale. The value of qualifying
offers, which decrease in total value, but increase in the percentage, raise as a
player gets drafted with a later pick, does not accurately reflect a player’s
value because it is based on where a player was drafted four years prior.49 For
example, Ben Gordon, the third overall draft pick in 2004, received a 31.2%
increase over his previous year’s salary by signing a qualifying offer for
$4,881,669. 50 Robert Swift, the twelfth overall pick in 2004, received a
37.6% increase over his previous year’s salary and signed a qualifying offer
for $3,579,131. 51 Despite averaging 19.5 more minutes, 16.8 more points, and
0.8 more rebounds per game during the preceding season, Gordon only
received $1,302,538 more than Swift.52 A sound conclusion is that Gordon
was underpaid and Swift was overpaid based on the unalterable qualifying
offer amounts, particularly when considering Gordon signed a $58,000,000
contract with a new team and Swift did not make an NBA roster the following
season, when the players were both unrestricted free agents. 53
No player drafted after the twelfth pick in any NBA Draft since 2000 has
ever signed a qualifying offer, presumably because the value of the one-year
deal was too low to even contemplate being accepted. On the other hand,
some players drafted later in the first round are not extended qualifying offers
by their respective teams because the players did not produce at a level where
their team wanted to keep them around for another season at the high
qualifying offer amount. All seven of the players who accepted a qualifying
offer over the past six seasons did so near the October 1 deadline.54

49. See Exhibit B-Rookie Scale, supra note 47. Over the past six seasons, three players (Ben
Gordon, Mickael Pietrus, and Vladimir Radmanovic) received one-year qualifying offers that were
well below what they were subsequently paid the following season. Two players (Robert Swift and
Melvin Ely) signed one-year qualifying offers that were well above what they were subsequently paid
the following season. One player (Stromile Swift) signed a qualifying offer that was right around the
annual average salary of his next contract. See infra Table 2.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Compare
Ben
Gordon,
BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.basketballreference.com/players/g/gordobe01.html, with Robert Swift, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/s/swiftro01.html.
53. See infra Table 2.
54. Each player signed the qualifying offer after not being able to secure a long-term deal with
their prior team or a contract with a new team that would be subject to the prior team’s right of first
refusal. Gordon signed the qualifying offer on October 1, Bulls Guard Gordon Skips Practice, Then
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Astoundingly, none of these players who signed a qualifying offer re-signed
with that same team during the next off-season. 55 This is possibly because
players can harbor resentment towards their prior team who failed to offer a
fair contract when the player was a restricted free agent. 56 The players’
reluctant acceptance of the qualifying offers and the teams’ overall lack of
initiative to sign the players to fair deals illustrates that a new process—with
criteria that arbitrators would use to encourage the parties to engage in
principled discussions to avoid an actual hearing—is needed so that players
can receive, and teams would only be required to make, market-value offers.
Also, teams should not be obliged to offer an inflated salary based on where a
player was drafted. Players may be more enthusiastic about signing a one-year
contract with their current team if the value of their salary was based on
objective criteria. 57
With the current system, NBA players might feel that a one-year deal at a
Signs Qualifying Offer, ESPN (Oct. 2, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3621188;
Ely on September 30, Ely Signs One-year, $3 Million Offer with Bobcats, ESPN.COM (Oct. 2, 2006),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/ story?id=2610570; Stromile Swift on September 30, General
Managers, HOOPSHYPE, http://hoopshype.com/general_managers/jerry_west.htm; Felton on
September 23, Chris Mannix, Felton Signs Deal with Bobcats, SI.COM (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ vault/article/web/COM1160535/index.htm; Pietrus on September 23,
Tom Ziller, Mickael Pietrus Relents, AOLNEWS (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.aolnews.com/
2007/10/02/mickael-pietrus-relents/; Radmanovic on September 21, Sonics Re-sign Radmanovic to
One-year Qualifying Offer, ESPN.COM (Sept. 21, 2005), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/
story?id=2168504; and Robert Swift on September 13, Thunder Re-sign C Swift, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Sept. 11, 2008), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/ news?slug=txthunderswift. Under Article XI, Section
4(c)(ii), “[i]f a Qualifying Offer is neither withdrawn nor accepted and the deadline for accepting it
passes, the Team’s Right of First Refusal shall continue,” but the player will no longer have the
option of signing the one-year qualifying offer and the current team can either offer a minimum salary
contract or wait until the player signs an offer sheet with another team and determine whether to
match the offer. NBA-ARB would operate under similar parameters.
55. See infra Table 2.
56. For example, during the 2005 off-season, the Seattle Sonics signed three different players—
Vladimir Radmanovic for $3,166,155, Reggie Evans for $1,100,000, and Ronald Murray for
$895,248— to one-year qualifying offers. Even though all three players were seeking long-term deals
with the team, all three were traded during the 2005–2006 season to three different teams, with each
player ending up signing new multi-year contracts the following season with a salary that was 165–
360% greater than their qualifying offers from the Sonics. One of the Sonics’ motives was possibly
to achieve cost savings by using the CBA rules that gave the team a right of first refusal and fixed a
low salary for the player’s respective qualifying offers to the team’s short-term advantage. See
generally Oklahoma City Thunder, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/thunder/news/offers050630.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2011); NBA & ABA Player Directory, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.basketball-reference.com/players (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
57. Other ancillary factors that would increase a player’s willingness to re-sign for one season
with his current team include a player’s prior injury history, the team’s position with respect to the
luxury tax, the team’s ownership situation, the team’s desire to see how the player performs with a
new coach, and a player’s desire to test the market the following year after improved production or
when the free agent class is not as strong.
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low salary does not offer the security of a long-term deal because they could
get injured the following season and not be able to recoup money in a new
deal. Moreover, players could think that their current team is not committed to
them. Conversely, the NBA’s salary cap and luxury tax do constrain some
teams’ ability to pay players their fair-market value. Teams frequently make
decisions on which player to sign and how much to pay the player based on
how the team’s payroll fits within the salary cap and luxury tax restrictions.
Teams will sometimes use the cap and tax parameters as an excuse not to offer
a player a certain contract. In particular, when a player is a restricted free
agent, other teams are reluctant to sign the player to an offer sheet because the
player’s prior team has seven days to determine whether to match the principal
terms of that offer sheet. 58 During the seven days, the new team’s salary cap
room or contract exception to the salary cap is committed to the player and
they may miss out on signing another player during this time span.59 To
increase the likelihood that a prior team will not match an offer sheet, the new
team will usually have to overpay a restricted free agent or add provisions to
the contract to dissuade the prior team from matching. The most common
contract provisions that a new team will include in an offer sheet are a signing
bonus, trade bonus, and up-front payment schedule. The prior team will
usually take an approach of telling the player to go out on the market, sign an
offer sheet to prove that other teams value him so highly in terms of how much
they are willing to pay, and then the prior team will either match that offer or
let the player leave. Thus, prior teams frequently do not engage in principled,
good faith bargaining because the CBA’s restricted free agency and qualifying
offer rules give the team considerable leverage. A common result is that the
player ends up leaving for another team or the prior team agrees to match an
offer that includes a base salary and contract provisions that are far more
generous than the player was willing to accept from the prior team in the first
place.
Having an arbitration process in place would increase a player’s
willingness to sign a one-year deal to remain with his current team and explore
free agency the following year. It would encourage good-faith negotiations

58. Pursuant to Article XI, Sections 5(d)(i)–(iv) and (e) of the NBA CBA, “principal terms”
include the term of the contract, base compensation, incentive compensation, early termination
options, payment schedule, and trade or signing bonuses of the new team’s offer sheet; a team that
has the right of first refusal can wait up to seven days to match the principal terms of the other team’s
offer sheet.
59. If a team is over the salary cap, the team can sign a player with either the mid-level exception
or bi-annual exception. For the 2009–2010 season the mid-level exception had a first-year salary of
$5,854,000 and the bi-annual exception had a first-year salary of $1,990,000. See NBA CBA, supra
note 8, art. VII, § 4(a)(1)(iv)(3).
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and create an impetus for the parties to agree to multi-year contracts. Players
and teams would both have leverage in negotiations, as opposed to the team
having too much power by tendering a low qualifying offer. The focus would
be more on creating value in a new deal structure as opposed to losing a player
because he was not offered what he, or the industry, would consider an
objectively reasonable salary.
NBA-ARB would also apply to players who were not drafted in the first
round. The arbitrators would be instructed that a player’s past compensation,
which is usually the minimum player salary for non-first round picks, should
not be given any weight. In addition to the seven former first-round draft
picks who have signed one-year qualifying offers, several second-round picks
and undrafted players have signed qualifying offers. 60 The requisite
qualifying offer for all restricted free agents who are not first-round picks is
extremely low. The predetermined qualifying offer for a non-first-round pick
is the greater of (1) the applicable minimum salary for the next season plus
$175,000, or (2) 125% of the player’s previous year’s salary. 61 Consequently,
these stipulated qualifying offers undervalue a player even more than the
rookie salary scale qualifying offers for first-round draft picks.
Only sixteen restricted free agents over the past six seasons signed offer
sheets with a new team that the prior team, who had the right of first refusal,
did not match. 62 Over this same period, thirteen players signed offer sheets
60. Four former second-round picks and undrafted players signed one-year qualifying offers this
past season, worth between $1,000,497 and $1,030,189: C.J. Watson, Aaron Gray, James Singleton,
and Steve Novak. These four players all received fair market value contracts. Other former secondround picks, such as Carl Landry, encounter a situation where their current teams extend a qualifying
offer for under $1,000,000 and the player’s options are limited because other teams are reluctant to
offer a contract due to the prior team’s right of first refusal. Second-round picks and undrafted
players are not subject to the first-round rookie scale and can sign contracts at a length between one
and four years as rookies. While NBA-ARB would apply to these players, on average historically,
more first-round draft picks are still in the NBA after two seasons and thus the focus of NBA-ARB
would be on first-round picks and the unbalanced qualifying offer system for this particular subgroup
of players. For reference, only seven to nine former second-round picks out of thirty selections each
year were still in the NBA after just two seasons in each of the past four years, compared to seventeen
to twenty-one former first-round picks playing past their four-year rookie scale contract over the past
four draft classes. See Salaries, DRAFTEXPRESS, http://www.draftexpress.com/nba-playersalaries/year/2009/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
61. See NBA CBA, supra note 8, art. I, § 1(rr). A qualifying offer for a former second-round
pick or undrafted player is usually for a raise from the minimum player salary worth between
$457,588 and $825,497. All terms and conditions in the qualifying offer must be unchanged from
those that applied to the last year of the player’s prior contract. Note, however, that some European
players drafted in the second round, such as Manu Ginobili, Andres Nocioni, Luis Scola, David
Andersen, and Marc Gasol, have received or will receive larger qualifying offers because they signed
lucrative rookie deals, which the teams offered to convince the players to give up their high-paying
contracts to join an NBA team.
62. See infra Table 3.
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with a new team that their prior team matched, thus keeping the player with
the prior team (see Table 3 for a list of restricted free agents signing offer
sheets with a new team during the past six seasons). In comparison, ten
unrestricted free agents in the 2010 off-season alone signed contracts with a
starting salary of at least $4,000,000 with a new team. 63 Players, teams, fans,
and the league can benefit from franchises keeping their marquee, former firstround draft picks and other players who want to stay, but end up leaving
because of a perceived injustice based on the current restricted free agency and
qualifying offer rules. The current system, where players end up grudgingly
signing preset qualifying offers, or teams reluctantly extend a qualifying offer
to an underperforming player, contradicts this goal.
V. START OF A NEW TREND TOWARDS FAIR SALARIES IN ONE-YEAR
CONTRACTS: THE KNICKS’ RECENT SIGNINGS OF DAVID LEE AND NATE
ROBINSON MIRROR OUTCOMES GENERATED BY NBA-ARB
Recently, the New York Knicks were the first team ever to re-sign a
former first-round pick who became a restricted free agent to a one-year
contract at a value greater than the pre-slotted qualifying offer established by
the rookie salary scale. The Knicks signed David Lee to a one-year,
$7,000,000 deal, even though the team was only required to tender Lee a oneyear qualifying offer worth $2,682,050. 64 The Knicks also signed Nate
Robinson to a one-year, $4,000,000 deal, even though his qualifying offer was
for $2,911,078. 65 Both players’ contracts also contained a $1,000,000 bonus
if the team were to make the playoffs. 66 Neither of these players had any real
leverage because no other team was offering to sign them to a restricted free
agent offer sheet worth what the players considered fair-market value.
According to Lee’s agent, Mark Bartelstein, “[t]here’s never been a player
who signed a deal worth more than the qualifying offer on a one-year deal. . . .
[The Knicks] did something that’s unprecedented [as] they could have taken a

63. See Salaries, HOOPSHYPE, http://hoopshype.com/salaries.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
64. Howard Beck, As Lee Soars, His Career as a Knick May Be Ending, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2010, at D4.
65. Robinson was the twenty-first overall pick and Lee was the thirtieth overall pick. After four
years in the NBA, Lee’s statistical production and role on the team outpaced that of Robinson.
However, under the existing rules, the Knicks still had to extend a higher-salary qualifying offer to
Robinson. See Exhibit B-Rookie Scale, supra note 47; Alan Hahn, Knicks’ Walsh Denies Trying to
Low-Ball Nate, Lee, NEWSDAY, July 14, 2009, at A49, available at http://www.newsday.com/sports/
basketball/knicks-walsh-denies-trying-to-low-ball-nate-lee-1.1307991?qr=1. Lee and Robinson no
longer play for the Knicks.
66. See Salaries, supra note 13; Marc Berman, Not a Lotto Luck; Knicks’ Misfortune Helps Jazz,
N.Y. POST, Mar. 29, 2010, at 60.
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much harder stance on this.” 67 The Knicks’ General Manager Donnie Walsh
furthered, “I hope the fact that the franchise treated [Lee] well and didn’t nail
him means something.” 68
The Knicks accomplished two goals by paying Lee and Robinson well
above their qualifying offer amounts: (1) the team avoided the possibility of
having to make a decision about matching a long-term offer sheet from a new
team, which would have added significant salary to their future 2010–2011
season salary cap space; and (2) the team treated each player fairly to ensure
productivity on the court and to maintain goodwill in the event that the team
and either player wanted to negotiate a long-term deal the following offseason. Instead of taking an uncompromising stance, the Knicks bargained in
good faith, following protocol that would now be required by all teams
pursuant to the provisions of NBA-ARB. Without a comprehensive arbitration
process, it is highly unlikely that other teams in the future will follow the
Knicks’ lead in paying players a one-year salary above the preset qualifying
offer amount. 69
VI. BEST AND IMPERFECT PRACTICES: MLB’S SALARY ARBITRATION
PROCESS
MLB has used final offer arbitration as a means of resolving salary
disputes since 1973. 70 In final offer arbitration, an arbitrator must pick one
party’s filing figure, and cannot create a compromise between the parties’
positions. The final offer format usually forces the parties to submit
reasonable proposals and encourages settlement in preference to allowing a
third-party neutral to favor the more defensible proposal. 71 The arbitration
system in baseball is effective in preventing players from being bound to
67. GM Donnie Walsh “rewarded Lee with a contract that was $4.5 million more than the Knicks
had to pay to keep him. Perhaps Walsh bought a little patience in the process.” Walsh denied that he
was trying to use the dried-up market to force both Lee and Robinson into taking much cheaper
qualifying offers; Walsh said, “I’m not trying to back them into something like that. There are other
ways of dealing with them than that.” See Howard Beck, As Lee Soars, His Career as a Knick May
Be Ending, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at D4; Marc Stein, Source: Robinson Close to Deal,
ESPN.COM (Sept. 25, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4501088; Hahn, supra note
65, at A49.
68. See Beck, supra note 64.
69. There are several reasons why a team may only want to sign a player to a one-year contract,
such as the Knicks’ desire to not sign players to contracts that extended past the 2009–2010 season in
order to preserve salary cap space for the 2010–2011 season.
70. In 1995, baseball owners proposed a switch from a sole arbitrator to a panel of three, and by
2000 all hearings were conducted by a three-arbitrator panel. In 1995, two hearings were decided by
panels, both victories by the team. See Edmonds, supra note 2, at 6.
71. Id. at 32.
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unfair contracts and avoiding actual hearings that are costly financially and
with regards to player-team relations. The system encourages good-faith
negotiations and the use of specific arbitration evidence criteria by the parties
before an actual hearing is conducted by an arbitrator panel. 72 The team
executive and the player’s agent will engage in contract discussions with the
overriding theme of an arbitrator’s likely interpretation of and weight given to
relevant evidence if the case proceeds to a hearing. The representatives
exchange information about comparable players and the particular player’s
statistical highlights, areas of improvement, and contributions to the team.
A three-arbitrator panel for baseball cases uses identifiable objective
criteria to quantify the player’s “value” to the team, including the quality of
the player’s contribution during the past season (i.e., his overall performance,
special qualities of leadership, and public appeal), the length and consistency
of his career contribution, the record of the player’s past compensation,
comparative baseball salaries, the existence of any physical or mental defects
on the part of the player, and the recent performance record of the team (i.e.,
the team’s standing in the league and attendance as an indication of public
acceptance). 73 The panel must pick either the team’s salary filing figure or the
player’s figure; they cannot meet in the middle, add any incentives or ancillary
options to the contract terms, or allow the parties to negotiate a long-term
contract. At a hearing, the parties are not allowed to introduce other criteria to
generate creative options, including previous negotiation offers, press
comments, the financial position of the player or club, testimonials from
teammates and community members, or awards and achievement outside of
baseball. 74
MLB team owners are concerned that salaries are escalating too much,
which is usually caused by arbitrators picking a player’s figure and
establishing a precedent salary for future comparable players and others in the
player’s service class, such as with Ryan Howard.75 Yet, some players who
are involved in the arbitration dispute process are not receiving salaries
commensurate with their level of productivity when compared to the general
free-agent market. Some team owners are blaming baseball’s current
economic imbalance on salary arbitration, fearing that rising player salaries are
72. However, some team owners feel that teams will acquiesce to player salary demands to try to
avoid the arbitration process at whatever cost. See Anthony Castrovince, Arbitration Season Reopens
Discussion: MLB’s Increasingly Scrutinized Process Gets Under Way, MLB.COM (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?c_id=mlb&content_id=7870548&fext=.jsp&vkey=news_mlb&y
md=20100104.
73. MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § F(12)(a).
74. Id. art. VI, § F(12)(b).
75. See Das, supra note 29, at 60.
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in direct correlation with the process of salary arbitration, even if arbitration is
not responsible for salary inflation in MLB any more than the free agency
system. 76
MLB could possibly establish a more customary form of arbitration where
the arbitrators could decide on a compromising figure. This is similar to one
component of NBA-ARB. The aim would be to potentially keep salaries more
level and prevent arbitrators from having to set the market at a number that is
too high or too low simply because it is more reasonable than the other party’s
filing figure in the final offer, high-low format. Because compromise is not
allowed within a particular decision, arbitrators may be tempted to “even the
score” by alternately ruling in favor of the disputing parties; for instance, if the
arbitrators’ decision in hindsight turns out to undervalue or overvalue a past
player, an arbitrator could favor the team or player or agent who felt slighted
in a future decision. 77 Nonetheless, the possibility of experiencing an
expensive loss in final offer arbitration can create a significant incentive to
settle prior to the arbitration hearing. 78 Because the arbitration system relies
on comparable players, every decision by an arbitrator provides valuable
instructive precedent for future parties to make arguments about why a player
is better than, equal to, or not too much worse than a player that was
previously awarded a certain arbitration salary.
When players and teams settle prior to a hearing, the result is usually a
one-year contract somewhere between the parties’ initial proposals, or a multiyear contract. One benefit of final binding arbitration is that teams prefer to
avoid hearings in which they may be forced to defend their proposals by
insulting players and presenting arguments that emphasize a player’s mental
and physical shortcomings, limited contributions to the team, or less than ideal
public appeal.79 MLB’s arbitration process is designed to be used sparingly; it
76. For example, Brian Cashman, the general manager of the Yankees, said that arbitration is “a
vehicle for a guy to make more than he’d make in free agency.” Castrovince, supra note 72; see also
Stuart Riemer, Albert Pujols: Major League Baseball Salary Arbitration from a Unique Perspective,
22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 219, 240 (2004); Das, supra note 29, at 59.
77. See generally Robert D. Bretz Jr. & Steven Thomas, Perceived Equity, Motivation and Final
Offer Arbitration in Major League Baseball, 8 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Resource Studies, Working
Paper No. 91-05, 1991), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/337.
78. Gordon, supra note 20, at 14.
79. See Roger Abrams, Inside Baseball’s Salary Arbitration Process, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 55, 63 (1999). Some MLB teams, including the Florida Marlins and Tampa Bay Rays,
have a “file and trial” approach where if the team and player exchange salary figures without having
reached an agreement prior to this exchange, the team will refuse to negotiate further and will take its
chances by proceeding directly to the arbitration hearing. This tactic is used to get the player to agree
to their zone of settlement and sign a contract at a figure favorable to the club or take a risk of going
to arbitration and is employed partly because profit-maximizing baseball clubs must sacrifice some
potential settlements to minimize their expected payments to players and some use it as a standard
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can fuel animosity between the team and players, and a player may avoid
playing up to his full potential the following season due to resentment toward
the team that introduced degrading evidence at a hearing. 80
In baseball, if a team does not want to engage in the salary arbitration
process and maintain exclusive negotiating rights with the player, they must
“non-tender” a player by December 12, which is the non-tender deadline. 81
By choosing to non-tender a player, the team does not offer the player a
contract and is making a determination that the player is not worth the salary
that he might command in the arbitration process. 82 A player who is nontendered is released from the control of the team, becomes an unrestricted free
agent, and can sign with any team, including his former team, at any price.
NBA-ARB’s arbitration tender offer is modeled after MLB’s requirement for
teams to make a contract tender if they want to retain exclusive negotiating
rights and pay the player a market-value salary commensurate with other
comparable players. 83
In 2010, there were 210 MLB players eligible for salary arbitration.
Eighty-two of these players either were non-tendered or agreed to contract
terms with their teams prior to the January 15 deadline to file for arbitration.
Of the remaining 128 players, 84 players agreed to contracts before even
exchanging figures with the team (5 of these players agreed to multi-year
deals), 36 players exchanged figures and agreed to contract terms to avoid

policy in an attempt to encourage settlements. See also David J. Faurot, Equilibrium Explanation of
Bargaining and Arbitration in Major League Baseball, 2 J. SPORTS ECON. 22, 30–34 (2001).
80. See Abrams, supra note 79, at 57.
81. See MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. XX, § A.
82. A tender, at a minimum, must be for eighty percent of his salary the previous season or
seventy percent of his salary from two seasons prior. Note that thirty-nine players were non-tendered
for the 2010 season. See Jeff Euston, Tender Date/Non-tender, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM (Jan. 30,
2007),
http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=665&Itemid=75.
83. Under Article VI, Section F (12)(a) of MLB’s CBA, “[t]he arbitration panel shall, except for
a Player with five or more years of Major League service, give particular attention, for comparative
salary purposes, to the contracts of Players with Major League service not exceeding one annual
service group above the Player’s annual service group. This shall not limit the ability of a Player or
his representative, because of special accomplishment, to argue the equal relevance of salaries of
Players without regard to service, and the arbitration panel shall give whatever weight to such
argument as is deemed appropriate.” Similarly, players and their representatives in NBA-ARB would
be allowed to make arguments that any restricted or unrestricted free agent is a relevant comparable.
The two-member arbitration panel would give whatever weight to such argument as is deemed
appropriate, with particular attention being given to restricted free agents with similar years of
service. For a former first-round pick who has achieved extraordinary accomplishments and is just
one service class away from being an unrestricted free agent the following season, the arbitration
panel would likely allocate more weight to the contracts of past unrestricted free agents and not just
other restricted free agents coming off of their rookie salary scale contracts.
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going to a hearing (14 of these players agreed to multi-year deals), and 8
players actually went to an arbitration hearing. 84 Teams won 5 of the 8 cases
at hearings in 2010, which marked the thirteenth time out of the last fourteen
years that the teams have won the majority of the decisions; since the first
hearings were held in 1974, teams have won 286 times and players have
prevailed 212 times, and, historically, 90% of the players filing for arbitration
reach an agreement before going to a hearing. 85
Approximately 23% of the employees in the bargaining unit of all MLB
players are covered by the salary arbitration clause—210 players were
arbitration-eligible out of the approximately 900 total players on each team’s
25-man roster and disabled list in 2010.86 NBA-ARB would cover only
approximately 7%-10% of the players. 87 Thus, its impact is not as far
reaching and it is limited to an important subgroup of restricted free agents
each off-season. NBA-ARB would not fundamentally change the dynamics of
free agency or cause player salaries to skyrocket out of control.
VII. BEST AND IMPERFECT PRACTICES: NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE’S
SALARY ARBITRATION PROCESS
Similar to the NBA, the National Hockey League has predetermined
values for qualifying offers. The qualifying offers in the NHL are solely based
on the salary earned by the player in the previous season. The qualifying
offers are not tied to a percentage of the league’s average player salary like the

84. The 128 players in the 2010 arbitration class saw a combined 107% increase over their 2009
salaries, and these players’ average salary for 2010 was $2,726,270, an increase of 2% from the
average of $2,746,582 for the 111 players in the 2009 salary arbitration class. See Edmonds, supra
note 2, at 35; Ed Edmonds, 2009 Arbitration Season Ends with Settlement, SPORTS L. BLOG (Feb. 20,
2009, 9:26 AM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2009/02/2009-arbitration-season-ends-with.html
[hereinafter 2009 Arbitration]; Maury Brown, 2010 MLB Salary Arbitration Players See Pay
Increase of 107 Percent, BIZOFBASEBALL.COM (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4108:2010-mlb-salary-arbitration-players-see-payincrease-107.
85. Since 2004, there have been seventy multi-year deals keeping the player under contract with
his current team for at least two seasons, which is twenty-one percent of all settlements during this
seven-year span. NBA-ARB would also serve as an incentive for players and teams to agree to multiyear contracts. See 2009 Arbitration, supra note 84.
86. See Listing: 210 Potential MLB Salary Arbitration Players for 2010, BIZOFBASEBALL (Nov.
13, 2009), http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =3742:listing210-potentially-mlb-salary-arbitration-players-for-2010&catid=66:free-agency-andtrades&Itemid=153.
87. This estimate is based on the number of players who have received qualifying offers during
the 2007, 2008, and 2009 off-seasons, plus players who might have received offers if the preset
amount was not so high or low based on where they were drafted and the salary earned in the
previous year, compared to the total number of players on an NBA roster.
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NFL designations. If a player earned $660,000 or less, the qualifying offer is
for 110% of his prior year’s salary; if a player earned between $660,000 and
$1,000,000, the qualifying offer is for 105% of his previous year’s salary; and
if a player earned more than $1,000,000, the qualifying offer is for 100% of
his previous year’s salary. 88 A similar system in the NBA would be unfair,
unprincipled, and unfitting because most players will typically have earned
greater than a 10% raise from their rookie salaries and other players should not
automatically get a raise if they were overpaid as a rookie. The focus should
be on the player’s current market value and not past compensation that was not
established under NBA-ARB procedures.
If an NHL player is a restricted free agent, his team must tender a
qualifying offer to him before June 30 if the team wants to maintain its rights
to the player. 89 In the NHL, a team or a player can elect arbitration, with such
election being made by July 5. If the team exercises its right to take the player
to salary arbitration, the player is given two weeks to accept or decline the
qualifying offer or engage in the arbitration process. 90 If the player files for
arbitration or the team elects to file for arbitration to determine the player’s
salary, the player cannot negotiate or sign an offer sheet with another team.91
In the NHL, the arbitrator can award a salary that is for either one of the two
offers made by the parties or for an amount ranging anywhere in between the
two offers.
The NHL also allows teams to have “walk-away rights.” An NHL team
has a right to reject the arbitrator’s award and refuse to bind itself to the
decision, allowing the player to either become an unrestricted free agent or
accept the last offer that was on the table by the team before the hearing.92
Previously, the team, after the arbitration hearing concluded and the parties
knew the arbitration award, has twice walked away from the arbitrator’s

88. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 10, § 10.2(a)(ii)(D); Aubut, supra note 1, at 202.
89. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 10, § 10.2(a)(ii).
90. See id. art. 12, § 12.9(b). Hearings, conducted by only one neutral arbitrator, are then
scheduled starting two weeks after this deadline (from July 20 to August 4). Forty-eight hours prior
to an NHL hearing, both sides are required to send a brief/memo (maximum of forty pages) to both
the arbitrator and the opposing side. NBA-ARB would follow the lead of the NHL and allow
arbitrators to be prepared heading into the hearing with knowledge of the particular player, potential
comparable players, and an introduction to arguments that are likely going to be made by the parties.
Also, the player should have the right to be present at the hearing, but should not be required to do so,
as in baseball and hockey. See Weiler, supra note 38, at 70.
91. As with NBA-ARB, an NHL player shall be subject to only one club-elected salary
arbitration in his career. And once the player and team are in the salary arbitration process, the player
is not permitted to engage in contract discussions with another team. See NHL CBA, supra note 7,
art. 12, § 12.3.
92. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12, § 12.10.
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decision in the last ten years. 93 By way of example, in 2009, when twenty
players filed for salary arbitration, the New York Rangers exercised its right to
walk away from the arbitrator’s award to Nikolai Zherdev, thereby allowing
him to become an unrestricted free agent.94 Because NBA-ARB would only
allow the team to initially elect salary arbitration, with the player having the
choice whether or not to accept it, NBA teams would not have walk-away
rights.
In the NHL, the arbitration procedures include a compensation
equalization system, which provides that when a restricted free agent is signed
by a new team, the former team is compensated for its loss of the player in the
form of draft picks. 95 As a result of the significant expenses incurred by a
new team to sign a restricted free agent in the NHL, there has been little
movement in the restricted free agent market. 96 The current NBA restricted
free agency process would not be further augmented to have some type of
compensation equalization system because there are only two rounds with
sixty total picks in the NBA Draft, compared to seven rounds in the NHL
Draft and fifty rounds in MLB Draft. Additionally, new teams already face an
obstacle in structuring the player’s contract to prevent a prior team from
deciding to match the offer sheet.
Similar to the NHL, the NBA arbitrators’ decision would include an
explanation of the player’s base salary and bonuses, and a five to ten page
report outlining the reasons why the particular salary and contract provisions
were decided upon and what evidence, comparable player salaries, and
contractual elements were most relevant. 97 Unlike the NHL, once a player

93. Yoost, supra note 3, at 491, 517–19.
94. Ray Slover, Hudler Case Headlines 2009 Arbitration Hearings, SPORTING NEWS (July 19,
2009), available at http://aol.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2009-07-19/hudler-case-headlines-2009arbitration-hearings.
95. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 10, § 10.4. A team that is entitled to but does not exercise
its right of first refusal is entitled to obtain draft choice compensation from the new team—for
example, if the offer sheet is for between $2 million and $3 million, the prior team receives a first and
third round draft choice.
96. See Aubut, supra note 1, at 195.
97. See NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12, § 12.9(n)(ii). While arbitrators in baseball write the
salary award number on a dotted line and do not give any opinions, explanations, findings or
statements of reasons regarding his opinion, arbitrators in hockey have forty-eight hours to write a full
opinion explaining the award. In MLB, the arbitrators are precluded from revealing the grounds on
which they based their selection of either the team or player proposal. While this saves time and
costs, it seems to hamper future negotiations or arbitration hearings between these same parties or
other players in the league because no system of precedent is set with justifications for which players
were deemed to be most comparable. There are benefits of creating precedent of the comparable
players and statistics and arguments from both parties that were persuasive to help prevent secondguessing and a perception of bias. See MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § F(5); Aubut, supra note

BUKSTEIN (DO NOT DELETE)

52

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

1/5/2012 2:42 PM

[Vol. 22:1

accepts the team’s arbitration tender offer and the parties proceed to a hearing,
the arbitrators in NBA-ARB could only award a one-year contract.98
Arbitrator Carol Wittenberg said that, “[a]rbitrators obviously prefer the
hockey system [over the MLB system], because we have an opportunity to
make the decision as to what salary is actually fairer or more appropriate.”99
VIII. POTENTIAL COSTS OF AND PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSED NBA
SALARY ARBITRATION MODEL
The NBA-ARB system has some potential costs and problems. For the
first class of eligible restricted free agents, there will be a lack of established
precedent or pool of comparable players. Because the format is not “pure final
offer,” more parties might be willing to take their chances at a hearing if the
arbitrators’ decision would likely be close to a suitable midpoint.100 The final
offer format also has more of a deterring factor in encouraging settlement
before a hearing. The costs of preparing for and attending a hearing and the
resulting damage to player-team relations in a potentially adversarial process
might outweigh the benefits. Players might become more selfish on the court
if they realize that their individual statistics could help them receive more
money in the salary arbitration process. This may be to the detriment of the
team as basketball is a game that relies on teamwork and coordinated plays,
rather than on individual performance like pitching or batting in baseball.
How might going to arbitration eliminate certain possibilities, including
players committing too quickly in free agency to their current team, players
not being able to sign an offer sheet with another team, or teams being
reluctant to go back to offering a multi-year deal once in the process? With
fewer players in the NBA than in other leagues, can accurate comparisons be
drawn? Should the pool of arbitrators be required to have knowledge of
basketball, such as the rules of the game, different types of plays, role of
different positions, and the impact of a team’s offensive pace and efficiency?
Does having arbitrators who watch basketball games and understand
fundamentals, such as offensive rebounding, steals, and pick and rolls, result
in better decisions based on an accurate interpretation of data? Or would this

1, at 205.
98. Whereas, in the NHL, the arbitrator can award either a one-year or two-year deal.
99. Carol Wittenberg, Panelist at The Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution Symposium: Sports
Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Fall 2001), available at http://www.cojcr.org/vol3no1/
symposia.html.
100. The theory is that parties will typically file at similar increments above and below what they
feel is a fair salary, which is why the midpoint is a valuable number to look at when determining a
player’s salary. See Das, supra note 29, at 58.
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have a negative impact in the arbitrators’ decision-making, such as forming
biases, a fandom of certain teams and players, an individual preference for
certain roles on the court, or an overemphasis on esoteric statistics such as a
player’s on-court plus-minus?
Despite the above-analyzed attributes of NBA-ARB, there are potential
risks and costs that must be addressed and monitored to ensure that the salary
arbitration system achieves its objectives. For now, arbitrators might have
some difficulty identifying accurate figures regarding the market value of
comparable players in order to determine the market value for a one-year
contract for a player who is party to a hearing. As the NBA-ARB process
develops, more players would likely enter the NBA-ARB system, and future
players will be able to utilize more player comparisons. Arbitrators would
need to continuously develop and systematically refine their skills in analyzing
the admissible evidence and rendering a multi-faceted arbitration decision.101
IX. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
If a NBA team thinks that a player’s market value, which is a fair salary
based on his performance and interest from teams, does not necessarily
correlate to his actual value to the team, it can decide to not offer an arbitration
tender and let the player become an unrestricted free agent who is able to sign
with a new team without the impediments that come with restricted free
agency. If a team wants to keep a player but is only offering to sign him to a
one-year deal, the team should pay the player a salary for that one season that
is determined by objective criteria. An arbitration process would help set out
certain measures that the parties could use together to craft an agreement, and
if no agreement is reached, a two-member panel would make such a
determination at a hearing.
NBA-ARB would encourage teams and players to utilize the criteria that
arbitrators would use during negotiations to reach a settlement before going to
an actual hearing. 102 NBA-ARB would also be economically feasible,
allowing NBA teams to pay a player less than NFL teams currently pay
players under the Franchise Player and Transition Player designations, and
accomplish numerous objectives beneficial to both teams and players. An
arbitration system helps provide certain gauges, thresholds, and parameters for
player compensation. Requiring a ceiling on the actual salary that a player
could earn, and having it tied to the league’s salary cap, which fluctuates each

101. See Yoost, supra note 3, at 518.
102. Note that in MLB, there has been an annual average of only six hearings per year over the
past seven seasons, including three hearings in 2009 and eight hearings in 2010.
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year based on the revenue that the league generates, is a needed deviation from
MLB’s arbitration system where there is a threshold on pay cuts but no cap on
pay raises. 103 In NBA-ARB, there would be no maximum salary reduction
rule, as a team should be allowed to pay a player his fair-market value.104
What a player was paid in a previous season should not be the main barometer
for what salary he should be paid in future seasons because this is not
indicative of his value. When first-round picks are under a set rookie salary
scale and second-round picks usually receive minimum salary contracts, a
player’s draft slot is not as relevant as his performance, consistent
productivity, and role on the team.
The NBA has probably not considered using a salary arbitration system
because it would be too complicated with high costs; the game is more teamoriented, there is no perceived benefit to teams, and the players conceded on
the current restricted free agent and qualifying offer rules for other benefits
that players receive in the current CBA. But, NBA-ARB would also minimize
delays, minimize holdouts, and eliminate procedural rigidity, unsatisfactory
results, and negative player-team relations.105
While NBA-ARB would likely be objected to by NBA teams and owners,
the NBPA should propose having salary arbitration as part of negotiations for
new CBA rules to counteract some of the extreme demands that NBA
Commissioner David Stern has suggested. Agreeing to such a system would
be a major concession for teams and owners in collective bargaining
negotiations. However, now is an opportune time for the NBPA to propose
using a salary arbitration process to maintain a level playing field, allow teams
to lock their players into long-term deals, remain competitive, and pay
restricted free agents who are in the arbitration process a fair one-year salary.
The CBA expired following the 2010–2011 season. In exchange for team
owners wanting a hard salary cap, lower maximum player salaries and annual
increases, and a reduction in player salaries and share of basketball-related
income, the players and the NBPA should ask for a change to the restricted
free agency rules. 106 The owners would unlikely get rid of the concept of
restricted free agency altogether, but modifications to the current rules could
help increase or limit player salaries so that restricted free agents would be
103. MLB’s maximum salary cut reduction rules. MLB CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § D.
104. This is compared to an NHL arbitrator, who may not award a player a one-year salary in
arbitration that is less than 85% of the aggregate sum of his previous salary plus bonuses. See NHL
CBA, supra note 7, art. 12, § 12.3(a)(ii).
105. See Yoost, supra note 3, at 491–98.
106. See Kyle Stack, NBA Labor Negotiations Breakdown: NBA Economic Experts Analyze
Talks Between the Player’s Union and Owners, SLAMONLINE.COM (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.slamonline.com/online/blogs/stacks-house/2010/04/nba-labor-negotiations-breakdown/.
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getting paid a fair value by their prior team or would be able sign with a new
team without the prior team having the right of first refusal. NBA-ARB would
allow late first-round draft picks who outperformed their rookie contracts
during the first four years to have a chance to be subject to an arbitration
process during their fifth year in the league, before becoming an unrestricted
free agent. The change to the current rules would not require teams to make a
high qualifying offer to high first-round draft picks that have underperformed
during their first four years in the league. The particular rules of NBA-ARB
would have a positive effect on how contract negotiations are resolved,
whether by following through with arbitration or by settling to avoid an
arbitration hearing. 107
Dialogue between the NBPA and the league office has made little progress
towards extending the current CBA or agreeing to terms that would be in a
new CBA. Pioneering solutions are needed to create a CBA that is acceptable
to both players and teams. Making minor modifications to the current free
agency and salary rules in place will not accomplish some core objectives that
a salary arbitration process could help achieve. Owners who want to reduce
the length and guarantees of player contracts would benefit from having
players sign short-term, one-year contracts offered by the new arbitration
system. At the very least, the NBPA should counter the owners’ proposal of
suggested terms in the new CBA with an innovative scheme, most notably a
salary arbitration system such as NBA-ARB that can help anchor future
collective bargaining negotiations and establish a better alternative to current
restricted free agency and qualifying offer rules.

107. See Yoost, supra note 3, at 492.
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TABLE 1: NBA SALARY ARBITRATION—THE PROCESS AND CRITERIA OF
NBA-ARB (NEW ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5)
The following salary arbitration procedure will apply to restricted free
agents in the NBA:
Player Eligibility: A player is eligible for salary arbitration if he meets the
following qualifications: (a) last played under a four-year rookie salary scale
contract; or (b) is otherwise classified as a restricted free agent subject to his
prior team’s right of first refusal pursuant to Article XI, Section 4(b).
Initiation of Process—Election of Arbitration by Team and Notice Given
to Player: A team must exercise its right to elect salary arbitration by
delivering a written request by personal delivery or pre-paid certified,
registered, or overnight mail to the NBPA and the player by July 15. 108 The
player must declare his intent to accept the team’s offer for arbitration (the
“arbitration tender”) by July 22. If the arbitration tender is accepted, the
player would no longer be able to accept any offers from another team; the
player and the team cannot withdraw from the arbitration process. If the
arbitration tender is not accepted, the player will remain a restricted free agent,
the team can now offer the applicable minimum player salary to retain his
rights, and the parties will not be eligible for salary arbitration.
Hearing—Scheduling, Attendance, and Conduct: If an agreement is not
reached by August 7, the player and team must file written briefs (not
exceeding fifty pages), including comparable player salaries and allowable
evidence (as defined below) with the Arbitration Panel. In no event will any
party overtly request a specific single salary figure in the brief for the player.
The one-page “one-year salary request” form must be completed and delivered
in a separate envelope indicating its contents to the Arbitration Panel. A
hearing for each player will be scheduled for the week that begins on or
includes August 14. No witnesses or testimonials will be allowed; the
hearings will take place in either New York or Los Angeles and will be
conducted on a private and confidential basis. A party’s written brief can be
updated once and re-sent to the Arbitration Panel within forty-eight hours of

108. This date is one week after the start of the free agency signing period and two weeks after
the date on which free agents are allowed to negotiate with any team. If a team fails to make an
arbitration tender by July 15, the player would become an unrestricted free agent.
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the scheduled hearing. The player and the team may be represented at the
hearing by union executives, league executives, and counsel. Each party will
have a total of ninety minutes to present its direct case and rebuttal case, with
a coin flip determining which party can elect to make its affirmative case first.
There will be no continuances, adjournments, or reopening of a hearing.
Selection of Arbitrators: At the beginning of each regular season, the
League and NBPA will jointly appoint fifteen Salary Arbitrators, all who must
be a member of either the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or
National Academy of Arbitrators. In the event that the parties are unable to
agree by December 1 of any season, the list of fifteen arbitrators will be
selected by the parties alternately striking names from a list of thirty
arbitrators provided by the AAA. An individual who has served as a
Grievance or System Arbitrator for the NBA cannot be selected as a Salary
Arbitrator. Arbitrators will be randomly assigned to particular cases. A
Salary Arbitrator may hear only two cases in a given off-season. Each case
will be heard by a two-member panel of Arbitrators. The Salary Arbitrators’
decision, made within seventy-two hours of the hearing and containing a brief
statement as to the reasons for the decision, including the identification of
which players were most comparable and what evidence was most relevant,
will be final and binding on the parties. The Arbitrators’ determination can be
for any one-year salary plus any addition of incentives, bonuses, and clauses,
subject to the “arbitrator award adjustment” exception.
Evidence—Admissible Criteria: Each party may present documents and
other evidence at the hearing; all statistical evidence asserted in a party’s
affirmative case must be included in the party’s pre-hearing brief delivered to
the Arbitration Panel in order to be admissible. Each party may use video and
interactive computer modules for visual exhibits that help demonstrate the
qualitative and quantitative data provided in the party’s brief. The Arbitrators
will be the judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence offered and
the weight attached to the evidence. The Arbitrators will be provided with
access to a statistical database via a secured internet link that is maintained and
updated by the League and NBPA during the season. Relevant statistics may
include the following: minutes, points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks,
turnovers, free throws, three-pointers, shooting percentages, plus/minus,
efficiency ratings, per game/possession/rate statistics, points produced,
defensive ratings, win shares, opponent-counterpart production, usage rate,
and shot selection and location. Parties can introduce evidence pertaining to
the following: (a) trends in a player’s career and platform year performance
(including totals, averages, disparities, improvement, and consistencies in
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games played, production, and injuries); (b) the team’s success (including the
team’s record, playoff appearances, and attendance); (c) the overall
contribution of the player and his role on the team (including awards won such
as sixth man of the year, most improved player, All-Star, All-Defense, or
ranking in the top-ten in the league in a certain category, the player’s
leadership, and off the court community involvement); and (d) the
compensation and evidence in clauses (a) to (c) of players alleged to be
comparable to the player. The Arbitrators will consider the salaries of all
comparable players and not merely the salary of a single player. Evidence of
the following will not be admissible: the player’s past compensation, what the
team’s qualifying offer would have been under old CBA rules, the financial
condition of the team, offers made by either party prior to the hearing, or press
comments. 109

109. For comparable CBA provisions, see NHL CBA, supra note 7, art. 12, § 12.9(g)(iii); MLB
CBA, supra note 10, art. VI, § F(12)(b).
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TABLE 2: NBA RESTRICTED FREE AGENTS SIGNING QUALIFYING OFFERS
DURING PAST SIX SEASONS

Player, Prior Team Draft
Pick #

Year of
Signing
Qualifying
Offer

One-Year
Qualifying
Offer –
Contract
Signed

Next Contract
Signed in
Season Following
when Player
Accepted Qualifying
Offer

Raymond Felton,
Charlotte

5th pick

2009

$5,501,196 110

Unrestricted Free
Agent in 2010

Ben Gordon,
Chicago

3rd pick

2008

$4,881,669

5 yrs, $58,000,000,
Detroit

Robert Swift,
Oklahoma City

12th
pick

2008

$3,579,131

Did not play in the
NBA

Mickael Pietrus,
Golden State

11th
pick

2007

$3,470,770

4 yrs, $21,200,000,
Orlando

Melvin Ely,
Charlotte

12th
pick

2006

$3,308,615

2 yrs, $1,893,739,
New Orleans

Vladimir
Radmanovic, Seattle

12th
pick

2005

$3,166,155

5 yrs, $30,247,000 ,
L.A. Lakers

Stromile Swift,
Memphis

2nd pick

2004

$5,993,105

4 yrs, $22,400,000,
Houston

110. Salary information is from the following sources: 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement,
NBPA.ORG (Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005; Salaries, HOOPSHYPE.COM,
http://hoopshype.com/salaries.htm;
Salaries,
HOOPSDATA.COM,
http://hoopdata.com/salaries/index.aspx.
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TABLE 3: NBA RESTRICTED FREE AGENTS SIGNING OFFER SHEETS WITH A
NEW TEAM DURING PAST SIX SEASONS

Free Agency Year

Offer Sheet Matched –
Offer Sheet Not Matched –
Player Returned to Prior
Player Joined New Team
Team

2009

Paul Millsap
Marcin Gortat

Jarrett Jack
Jamario Moon
Ryan Hollins
Ramon Sessions

2008

Josh Smith
C.J. Miles
Carl Landry
Kelenna Azubuike

Nenad Krstic
Ronny Turiaf

2007

Anderson Varejao
Charlie Bell

Jason Kapono
Maceo Baston

2006

N/A

Jared Jeffries
John Salmons
Jackie Butler

2005

Damien Wilkins
Chris Duhon

Zaza Pachulia

2004

Etan Thomas
Trenton Hassell
Morris Peterson

Carlos Boozer
Mehmet Okur
Hedo Turkoglu
Mo Williams

